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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,  
 
 Sotero Sanes appeals from a final judgment and  
commitment order of the district court.  On December 29, 1993, an 
information was filed charging Sanes with burglary in the first 
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 442(1); rape in the first 
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1701(3); robbery in the first 
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1862(2); and possession of a 
dangerous weapon during the commission of a violent crime, in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2)(B).   
 Sanes was accused of attacking Carmen Velez on January 
13, 1993 and again on July 14, 1993.  Counts I, II, III and IV 
stem from the first attack and Counts V, VI and VII from the 
second.  Sanes was convicted on all counts.      
 Sanes argues that the district court erred by denying 
his motion to suppress.  He contends that the voice 
identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.  Further, 
he argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
limiting his expert witness' testimony about the validity of the 
voice identification procedures.  Finally, Sanes contends that 
the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to sever 
Counts I, II, III and IV from Counts V, VI and VII, arguing that 
the charges arose from separate incidents and their joinder was 
highly prejudicial to him.  We will affirm.  
 I.  
 
 
 Sanes argues that the trial court violated his right to 
due process by denying his motion to suppress the voice 
identification.  He contends that his voice sample was tainted by 
outside factors, technical and otherwise, which could have 
influenced the listener, making it more likely that his voice 
would be selected.  He cites background voices, longer delivery 
time, different transition time between the statements made in 
Spanish and those made in English, his monotone and a number of 
interruptions, as examples of the factors which he believes, when 
taken cumulatively, compromised the reliability of the 
identification.  
 We find no evidence that the procedures used were 
impermissibly suggestive or that there was a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification.  Ms. Velez heard the voice of 
her attacker on both January 13, 1993 and July 14, 1993.  On each 
occasion, she conversed with the intruder for ten minutes.  She 
listened to the voice array three times.  She was ready to 
identify Sample No. 4 after the second time, but was encouraged 
by the police to listen to the tape one more time.  Velez then 
positively identified the fourth voice as that of her attacker.  
Sample No. 4 was Sanes' voice. 
 The district court listened to the voice array and 
found that all of the voices contained unique factors.  After 
listening to Sanes' expert witness on voice identification 
procedures, the district further found that, although Sample No. 
 
 
4 was different from the other samples, the differences did not 
present a sufficiently significant contrast as to cause 
misidentification.  Before denying Sanes' motion to suppress, the 
district court applied the eyewitness identification test, 
enunciated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972) 
and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).  
Sanes argues that this test is inapposite.  We disagree. 
 In Neil, the Supreme Court developed a five-part test 
to test the reliability of an eyewitness identification.  The 
Neil factors include the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime; the witness' degree of 
attention; the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the 
criminal; the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the time of the confrontation; and the length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation.  93 S.Ct. at 382.  Expanding on 
Neil, Manson held that admitting testimony even following a 
suggestive identification procedure does not violate due process 
if the identification has sufficient indicia of reliability.  97 
S.Ct. at 2252-53.  Although voice identification obviously 
differs from eyewitness identification (for example, what is at 
issue in the first part of the Neil and Manson test is 
opportunity to view rather than opportunity to hear), we conclude 
that the Neil and Manson eyewitness identification test, adapted 
to voice identification, provides a standardized source of 
 
 
guidance to district courts for assessing the reliability of 
voice identification as well. 
 Applying Neil, the district court found that Ms. Velez 
was alert and had a sufficient opportunity to view or hear her 
attacker on both occasions and that she presented an accurate 
description of the defendant and his clothing (which she later 
identified.)  Moreover, she identified the items taken from 
appellant as looking like items the perpetrator had worn, and 
there is no evidence indicating that these items, when presented 
to Ms. Velez, were suggestively linked to either the appellant or 
to Sample No. 4.  Further, Ms. Velez stated that she was certain 
that Sample No. 4 was the voice of her attacker.  Finally, 
although there was a six-month period between the incidents, only 
fifteen days elapsed between the last attack and her positive 
voice identification.  We also note that Ms. Velez not only 
listened to her attacker for a considerable period of time during 
the two incidents but testified that she engagaed him in 
conversation in the hope that she could identify his voice, and 
hence the opportunity and degree of attention criteria of 
Neil/Manson are met.  We also listened to the tape during oral 
argument, and conclude that the evidence supports the district 
court's findings and conclusions.  We conclude that the district 
court properly applied the Neil/Manson factors and properly 
denied Sanes' motion to suppress the voice identification.          
    II.  
 
 
 Sanes next argues that the district court erred by 
prohibiting expert testimony comparing voice identification and 
eyewitness identification.  The district court permitted the 
testimony of Sanes' expert witness, Dr. Harry Hollien, a 
professor of linguistics, on the question whether the voice 
exemplar containing the defendant's voice was suggestive.  Dr. 
Hollien was also permitted to comment on the distinguishing 
characteristics of Sanes' voice sample and their impact, if any, 
on Ms. Velez's positive identification.  However, the district 
court would not permit Dr. Hollien to explain to the jury why 
voice identification was not as accurate as eyewitness 
identification under ideal circumstances.  
 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion 
or otherwise."  Whether to allow scientific or technical expert 
testimony, however, is within the discretion of the district 
court and is reviewed only for abuse.  United States v. Downing, 
753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,     
U.S.    , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), when faced with the proffer of 
expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the district court 
must preliminarily assess whether the testimony underlying the 
 
 
reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can properly 
be applied to the facts at issue.  The district court properly 
held a Daubert hearing in which the nature of Dr. Hollien's 
testimony was fully considered.  We conclude that the district 
court appropriately limited Dr. Hollien's expert testimony to the 
pertinent issue of whether the distinguishing factors on Sample 
No. 4 unduly influenced Ms. Velez's selection.  We also conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
from the jury's consideration the testimony that would have 
compared eyewitness and voice identification; such testimony was 
of limited probative value, and that value would have been 
outweighed by waste of time and confusion.  See Downing, 753 F.2d 
at 1232. 
 III.  
 Finally, Sanes argues that the district court abused 
its discretion by denying his pretrial motion to sever Counts I 
through IV from Counts V, VI and VII.  He contends that joinder 
of the counts involving two separate incidents substantially 
impaired his right to a fair trial.  We disagree.  Ms. Velez's 
testimony and a common modus operandi provided sufficient reason 
to deny Sanes' motion to sever the counts and to conduct a single 
trial. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides: 
  
 [I]f it appears that a defendant or the 
government is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or 
information or by such joinder for trial 
together, the court may order an election of 
 
 
separate trials of counts, grant a severance 
of defendants or provide whatever other 
relief justice requires.  In ruling on a 
motion by a defendant for severance the court 
may order the attorney for the government to 
deliver to the court for inspection in camera 
any statements or confessions made by the 
defendant which the government intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
 
 Sanes must demonstrate that joinder would result in a 
"manifestly unfair trial," beyond a mere showing that he would 
have had a better chance of acquittal with separate trials.  
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 925, 112 S.Ct. 340 (1991).  Here, Ms. Velez 
identified Sanes as the person who attacked her both times.  
Moreover, during the second attack Sanes inculpated himself in 
the first offense by referring to Ms. Velez' failure to keep 
quiet following the first attack.  The modus operandi of the 
crimes is similar and it was evident that Ms. Velez would have to 
testify about both incidents, which would have required the 
government to offer essentially the same proof in both trials.  
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying Sanes' motion to sever the counts that stem from the 
first incident from those of the second.  
 IV. 
 In sum, we have examined all contentions raised by the 
appellant and conclude that the district court's decisions were 
proper in all respects.  We will affirm.                 
